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Current Developments
The Commissions for Protection of Child

Rights Act, 2005 - A Critique
Mani Gupta*
In this note, the writer comprehensively and critically analyses the

various provisions of the Commissions for the Protection of Child
Rights Act, 2005. The note takes a close look at the mandate, the
composition, the powers and the functions of the two tier
Commission for Protection of Child Rights . The note also vehemently

argues for providing more financial autonomy to the Commission.
The note then critically examines the innovative idea of a 'Children's
Court.' Finally, it questions the efficacy of having the Commission,
given the surfeit of commissions which have been entrusted the task
of protecting human rights.
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I. Introduction

The Commissions for the Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 ("th

passed by the Indian Parliament provides for the establishment of
Commission for Protection of Child Rights ("the Commission"). Th

purpose of the Act is to give effect to the international obligations of
Government contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (t

" IV Year, B.A. LL.B (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Ba

1 Preamble, Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 [herei
Actl.
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The Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005
The spectrum of child rights has been increasing and there has been growing
consciousness to accord protection to various rights of the child such as the right
to nutrition, rights of the girl child, right to expression and freedom to form

opinions etc. In light of this, the Commission will have not only the task of
continuously educating children and adults alike on these rights but it would also
have to enforce some of these rights.
This note critically examines various aspects of the Act such as the mandate,

composition, powers and functions of the Commission and State Commissions
and the provisions relating to the Children's Courts in the backdrop of Paris
Principles,2 the working of the National Human Rights Commission ("NHRC") and
the experiences of similar commissions in other parts of the world. The note also
attempts to identify various issues of concern that may arise in the working of the
Act and suggest possible solutions and remedies for the same.

II. Mandate of the Commission

The Commission's mandate is to be determined by the meaning given
phrase "child rights." A perusal of the definition of the term "child righ

section 2(b) of the Act3, gives the impression that the Commission h

mandate, which is capable of being subsequently expanded. This is so beca

definition of child rights is an inclusive definition, which allow

interpretation to include not only those rights that currently exist o
framework of the CRC but also those which may subsequently evolve.
this definition enables the Commission to take cognizance of cases

violation of child rights not only by the State but also by individuals. The

would appear that the Commission under the Act has a much broader
for operation in accordance with the Paris Principles.

2 These principles are more formally known as "Principles Relating to th
and Functioning of National Institutitions for Protection and Promotion o
Rights" and were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in re

number A/RES/48/134 in the year 1993. The broad principles relat

following heads - i) competence and responsibilities based on a broad man
human rights, ii) autonomy from the state and pluralism in the constitu
adequate modes of operation, iv) principles relating to those commission
quasi - judicial competence.

3 The term "child rights" is defined under § 2 (b) of the 2005 Act as follow

""child rights" includes the children's rights adopted in the United

convention on the Rights of the Child on the 20th November, 1989 and ratifi

the Government of India on the 11th December, 1992."
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In contrast, the definition of human rig
Rights Act, 1993 ("PHRA")4 is restrictive as

life, liberty and dignity of the individua
contained in the international covenants n

Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the I

Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). Ano

human rights under the PHRA is that only t
Courts are covered by the definition. The p
fundamental rights contained in the Constit

courts in India. As a consequence, the con
Constitution of India indicates that the

violations as are committed by the State and

III. Composition

As per Chapter II of the Act, the National Commission shall comprise
Chairman and six other members.5 The Chairman is to be appointed on th
of the recommendations of a three member committee headed by the Min
charge of the Ministry of Human Resource Development instead of the Mi

for Women and Child Development, whose primary mandate is to tak

issues such as child welfare and development.6 The other member
Commission are to be appointed by the Central Government but no

procedure or Selection Committee has been laid down.7 Instead, the Act pr
that the members have to be persons of eminence who have done work in t
of child welfare and child rights.8 This criterion provides a leeway for su

interpretation of the provisions by the government of the day, thereby in
the likelihood of politicization of the appointments made on the Commissi
instance, it may be noted that on an earlier occasion, the decision to ap
Central Bureau of Investigation Chief, Mr. P. C. Sharma as a member of th
had resulted in wide spread protests from within and outside the NHRC.9

4 The PHRA is the Act passed by the Indian Parliament to establish the NH
pretty much the same lines as the Commission for the Protection of Child
5 § 3(2), 2005 Act.

6 § 4, 2005 Act. This has been subsequently amended by the Commissions tor
Protection of Child Rights (Amendment) Act, 2006.
7 § 4, 2005 Act.

8 § 4, § 3(2)(b), 2005 Act.

9 A. G. Noorani, A Policeman as Judge?, available at
http://www.epw.0rg.in/epw/upl0ads/articles/890.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007).
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The appointment of NHRC's Chairperson and other members takes place
under the seal of the President and on the recommendation of a six member

Committee comprising of the Prime Minister and the Leader of Opposition.10 Th

Selection Committee offers a much broader spectrum and consequently lesse

chances of politicization of the process and it would be prudent for the legislatur
to incorporate such a procedure under the Act.
Further, even the power of removal of the Chairman and members of the
Commission has been vested in the Central Government. The removal of the

Chairman and members is to be on certain specified grounds by an order passed

by the Central Government.11 Though the Act provides that the concerne

Chairman and/or member sought to be removed has to be given an opportunity
of being heard12, the nature and procedure of any enquiry proceedings is unclea
under the Act unlike under the PHRA.13

As a consequence of these provisions, unbridled powers have been given
to the Central Government in the matter of appointment and removal. Such
sweeping powers also open up the possibilities of abuse by the Government to
offer post-retirement benefits to retired bureaucrats. Further, the upper age limit

for membership to the Commission virtually rules out the selection of retired
judges of the Supreme Court.14 It is argued by many authors in the context of the
NHRC that the presence of retired members of the judiciary has been one of the

important reasons that have enabled the Commission to maintain some of its
independence from the Government.15 While this may be true in the context of the

NHRC, the appointment of eminent lawyers, NGO workers etc. can be used an
effective check against political biases and independence of the Commission.
10 § 4, Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
11 § 7, 2005 Act.

12 § 7(3), 2005 Act.

13 § 5, Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
14 § 5, Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 reads:

"The Chairperson and every Member shall hold office as such for a term of three
years from the date on which he assumes office:
Provided that no Chairperson or a Member shall hold the office for more than two
terms:

Provided further that no Chairperson or any other Member shall hold o
such after he has attained;- .
(a) in the case of the Chairperson, the age of sixty-five years; and
(b) in the case of a Member, the age of sixty years."

15 Carolyn Evans, Human Rights Commissions and Religious Conflict in th
Pacific Region , 53 Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 713 (2004). See alsof Vijayashri Sripat
Human Rights Commission: A Shackled Commission?, 18 B.U. Int'l L.J. 1
[hereinafter Sripati].
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The plurality of the Commission's compo

that unlike the PHRA and the National C
Commission does not have representation

NHRC and the National Commission for Wo
of such members would also have ensured that there is better coordination

amongst these several bodies, who may be working on over lapping areas of righ
On the other hand, under the PHRA, the Chairpersons of the NCW, the Nation
Commission for Minorities and the National Commission for the Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes are deemed to be members of the NHRC for the purpose of

discharging its functions under section 12 of the PHRA. Similarly, under the
proviso to section 3(2)(b) of the National Council for Women Act, 1990, one
member each has to be from the Scheduled Caste and the Schedule Tribe each,
thereby bringing in plurality in the composition of the NCW.
Quite positively, though, the Act that it makes a provision for at least two of
the six members on the Commission to be women,17 thereby bringing a semblance
of gender parity and plurality in the composition of the Commission. A perusal of

all the provisions relating to the composition of the Commission points to the
obvious conclusion that the Commission fails to meet the criterion of plurality
and independence in its constitution under the Paris Principles. The Commission
is tethered to the executive, which exercises a vast degree of unguided control
over the Commission's constitution. Further, the plurality in the constitution has
been seriously ignored and marred by the myopic sight of the drafters of the
present law.
The Central Government has been given the powers to make appointment
of administrative staff.18 The inability of the Commission to appoint its own staff

has the potential of affecting not only the autonomy of the Commission but also

its efficiency. Among the problems that may be envisaged is the problem of
remaining under-staffed on account of Government's failure to make appointments
on time, but also the fact that often, the staff appointed may be from the existing

bureaucracy without any training in human rights and more specifically, child
rights.19 It is imperative that even if the Government makes the appointments,
there are certain criteria which provide for the creation of a sensitive and informed
administration instead of promoting red-tapism within the Commission.
16 Sripati, supra note 15, at 12.

17 § 3(2)(b), 2005 Act.
18 § 11, 2005 Act.
19 bnpati, supra note 15, at 34.
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IV. Powers of the Commission

The powers of the Commission maybe broadly classified under the follo

heads -

a) Investigative powers
b) Advisory powers
c) Educative powers
d Residuary Powers

Investigative Powers
Sections i3(i)(c) and i3(i)(j) of the Act enable the Commission to inquire
into violations of child rights either on the presentation of a complaint or suo
moto . However, the power of the Commission to take action is fettered because it

is neither empowered to initiate proceedings on its own nor are its
recommendations to do the same of a binding nature on the concerned Government
or other authority.20 As a result, the Commission is once again dependant on the
Central Government or the Courts to take action in cases involving violation of

child rights. Further, the Commission's recommendation for awarding interim
compensation to a victim and/or his/her family is also not of binding nature.21
Therefore, there may be several cases where compensation is refused to be paid
by the Government even in deserving cases thereby denying any sort of relief to

the victim.22

In the context of the investigative powers of the Commission, it is also
important to note that the Legislature has by design or by neglect failed to make

a provision for providing adequate "investigative forces" available to the
Commission unlike the PHRA which makes a specific provision for making
investigative staff available to the NHRC.23 It therefore seems like an absurd
20 § 15O) and §i5(ii), 2005 Act.
21 § i5(iii), 2005 Act.
22 Sumanta Banerçee, Human Rights in India in the Global Context , available at http:/

/www.epw.org.in/epw/uploads/articles/242i.pdf (last visited May 8, 2007). In

many cases, the author of the article reports that State Governments have obtained

stay orders from Courts and thereby not paid compensation to the cases
recommended by the NHRC.

23 § n(i)(b), Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 reads:
"The Central Government shall make available to the Commission -

a) ....
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proposition to suggest that the Commissio

matter involving violation of child rights wh
the necessary, trained staff for the same in

the Paris Principles. In this context, instea

from the experience of the NHRC and provid

to the Commission similar to the "Quick
Philippines Human Rights Commission.24

doctor, a lawyer, a trained investigator and p
would investigate into any violation that com

The independent investigative agency is p
experience of the NHRC shows that a num

cases where police personnel are the alleged p

In such a scenario, it would be efficacious

conduct the investigation for an impartial re

The lack of investigative resources, skil

severely inhibits the independence of the Co
over it being possessed of adequate modes of p
of the Paris Principles for domestic institutio

Monitoring and Advisory Functio

Like most Commissions constituted fo
Commission for also has a vast mandate re
and monitor various policy aspects under
Section 13(1) of the Act.

The advisory functions of the Commission
apply the requisite pressure on the Governm
for the protection of child rights25 and for r
In order to ensure that Commission's recomm

b) such police and investigative staff under

Director General of Police and such other offic
the efficient performance of the functions of

24 Sripati, supra note 15, at 32.

25 Brice Dickson, The Contribution of Human
Human Rightsf Public L., 272 (2003). The au
role of domestic human rights commissions
in Northern Ireland with respect of influencin
including the legislature, the executive and
powers of the commission.
26 Id.
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there should be a mechanism to ensure that they are given "full and faithful"27

consideration. For instance, the Queensland Commission provides for a "child
guardian" who co-ordinates with the executive namely, the Department of Child
Safety.28 Further, the Queensland Commission is also empowered to approach the
Minister and compel him to table before the Parliament such recommendations
as are not complied with by the Department of Child Safety in certain matters.29
Another recommendation for the effective enforcement of the recommendations

is to give the Government a time frame within which it has to respond to a
recommendation made by a Commission. The time limit however must be neither
illusory nor such as would take away from the immediacy of the situation.30
The independencie of the Commission is important in the context of the fact
that India has the largest population of children31 and hence, it has to play the
pivotal role of not only ensuring the adoption of child friendly policies, but also
monitor existing policies and practises at the domestic level. At the international
level, the role of domestic institutions in assisting treaty monitoring has never
been emphasised more than in recent times. The inclusion of this power can serve

as an effective check in ensuring that the Government fulfils its international
obligations. Accordingly, the Commission could have been given powers to make
reports to the international monitoring agencies such as the one constituted under
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.32

Educative Role

In a vast country like India, where a majority of the population is stil

aware of its rights, the power under section i3(i)(h) assumes fundame

importance. This power is necessary to bring about the relevant societal ch
and to educate children and adults alike of the rights of the child. In this r

27 Submission to the Advisory Committee established to Review provisions
Protection of Human Right Act , 1993, available at http://web.amnesty.org
ai.nsf/a85f4dc838iecc7b80256f33003ae7b3/28d78b62fc4d5d0b80
25Ó9000069326d!0penD0cument (last visited May 6 2007).
28 See http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/qld/consol_act/cfcaypacga 2000511/
(last visited May 6, 2007).
29 See http://www.childcomm.qld.gov.au/monitoring/index.html (last visited May
6, 2007).

30 See http://www.publicati0ns.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtrights/67/
67ap26.htm (last visited May 6, 2007).
31 See http://www.cry.org/CRYCampaign/Manifesto.htm (last visited May 6, 2007).
32 Anne Galleghar, Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations A Reality: Working with
New Actors and Partners , in The Future of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Monitoring

201 (Philip Alston ed., 2000).
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the Commission would be required to pursu

target educating children about their rig
meaningfully, the Commission should ens
vernacular languages other than Hindi and

audience. Moreover, in this respect, the Com

other Commissions and pool their resour

effectively. For instance, the Commission c

educate women about the rights of the girl c
other young children, etc.

Residuary Powers

The residuary powers of the Commissi
underestimated because it provides the C

innovate a role for itself in society for the

the residuary power of the Commission,
enable children themselves to make com

that may occur within social institutions su

case of street children, orphans etc by providing easier access to the
Commission. In the cases of children especially those living in juvenile prisons,
shelter homes etc. the Act should have made a provision to enable them to
contact the Commission through a person of the Commission situated at these
places.33
Moreover, since the definition of "child rights" does not restrict itself to
only those rights as are enforceable against the State, it is surprising that there are

no suitable directions as to whether an individual can be compelled to pay
compensation to a victim. This assumes greater importance in light of the fact
that a significant number of cases of child right's violations involve individuals
rather than state bodies.

Further, like NHRC, the Commission also should have been given the power

to act as amicus curiae in cases of child rights violations. This power could be
useful as the Commission will be best equipped to assist the courts in child abuse
cases, especially in those which involve large scale violations of child rights.34
33 In Queensland, Australia, there is a Commission for Child and Young People and
Child Guardian. This Commission serves a number of purposes similar to those of
the proposed Commission. The Commission has a "Community Visitor" who is the

link between children in youth detention centres etc. Available at http://

www.ccypcg.qld.gov.au/complaints/index.html (last visited May 6, 2007).

34 Ian Bynoe, Sarah Spencer, A Human Rights Commission for the United Kingdom Some Options , Eur. Hum. Rts. L.R. 152 (1997). The author discusses various options
for creating a human rights commission in the UK and in so doing, discusses, the
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V. Financial Autonomy of the Commission

The Paris Principles, as has already been stated, adopt the criterion
Commission should be independent from the government at the domes
Financial autonomy is an integral part of this independence, for whi
Commission is dependent on the Union and State Governments at the cent
state levels respectively. The independence of the Commission can be e

only if the Government is willing to appropriate adequate sums of money. F

the autonomy of the Commission will be further strengthened and ma
only if the Commission has complete discretion on the manner in which it
to spend the money to reach its goals, of course, with a certain mechan

accountability.

VI. State Level Commissions

While the Commission will be the body in the Centre, the State Gove

have been given the power to establish State Level Commissions. The
Commissions can play a very important role in the monitoring ch

violations primarily due to their geographical proximity to residents of a

state. Further, the absence of state level Commissions would also hi
efficiency of the national level Commission as it could be over burd

complaints from all over the country. In light of these considerations, i

surprising to note that the duty to establish State level Commissio
mandatory in nature.35

The independence of the State level Commissions is similarly aff

that of the national level Commission because of the absolute nature of
the State Government in matters of appointment and removal of Chairp
member of these Commissions.36

While most powers of the State level commissions are similar to that of the

National Commission there is an important distinction between the two
commissions. Unlike the National Commission, a State Commission is not
precluded from taking cognisance of a complaint which is pending before another
various powers the commission could have. One of the suggestions put forth by the
author of the article is that the commission should have the power to initiate a

class action on behalf of victims.

35 § 17(1), 2005 Act reads: "A State Government may constitute a body to be known
as

powers conferred upon, and to perform the funct

under this Chapter."

36 § 17, 2005 Act.
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commission.37 This allows the state level commission to create an interactive

relationship with other commissions such as NHRC, State Human Right

Commissions or the National Commission for Women by coordinating with these
bodies when complaints relating to abuse and violation of child rights are placed
before them. Further, since the state level commission has been given the power

to interfere in a matter already placed before another commission, there is
possibility that the more specialised commission may be able to deal with th
complaint in a better fashion. Thus, in order to ensure that no conflicts ari

because of this power of the state level commissions, there is a need for providin
for transfer of cases between various national and state level commissions set up
for protection of human rights etc.

VII. Children's Courts

The Act empowers the State Government to designate a Sessions Court
"Children's Court" to provide speedier trial of offences against children in
district.38 These courts can play an important role in assisting the Commi

they are likely to be far more accessible to people residing in various d
across the country.39

However, two significant loopholes may be taken note of in the provi

relating to Children's Courts. First , the power to designate such cou

discretionary.40 The experience of the Human Rights Courts under the PHR
us that such blind faith on the sincerity of the state governments to estab
courts is often misplaced. Therefore, it will not be out of place to provide t

state government should be required to mandatorily set up these cou
Secondly, the Act only purports to name a Sessions Court as a Children
and in the absence of special rules of procedure and recording of evide
proposed Children's Court would function in the same way as ordinary

courts.42 In light of this anomaly, it would have been more expedient to e
37 § 24, 2005 Act.

38 § 25, 2005 Act.

39 K. G. Kannabiran, Justice Must be Seen to be Done, available at

http://t2web. amnesty. r3h.net/library/pdf/ACT300 10 i998ENGLISH/$File/
ACT3001098.pdf (last visited May 6, 2007).
40 § 25, 2005 Act.

41 Victims of Human Rights Violations Feel Harassed, available at

http://www.tribuneindia.c0m/2005/20050227/cth1.htm (last visited May 6,
2007).

42 Sripati, supra note 15, at 35.
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a Board similar to the one constituted under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000
providing for a special procedure for trial in cases of child rights violations owing
to the vulnerable nature of the victim. Further, the officers to such Children's
Court should be giving special training to deal with the victims and their families
in a sympathetic and humane manner. Another aspect in relation to the Children's
Courts is that in order to better protect a child in conflict with the law, there
should be a unification of the Juvenile Justice Boards established under the

Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and the Children's Court because eventually the

purpose of the two institutions is to protect a child. Hence, it is the author's opinio
that the Children's Courts being of a specialised nature should take care of those
children who are in conflict with the law.

VIII. Conclusion

While it may be argued that a specialised body like the Commi

Protection of Child Rights is a positive move towards protection of chi
the idea for such an independent commission does not pass the mus
obvious scepticism. The mushrooming of commissions for protection
rights, women's rights, minority rights and now child rights, woul
result in the dilution of the power of the various existing commissions

one has to wonder as to the real need for so many independent com
Even while conceding the requirement for such independent bodies

worthwhile for the government to consider ways of ensuring coordinati
these different bodies and avoid conflict of interest by ensuring that th
to pool in their resources for various functions, that there are official
communication and consultation between these commissions so that there is

neither duplication of work and/or conflict of interest.

Further, in the drafting of the Act, various aspects such as the experience o

the NHRC and the Paris Principles have been overlooked by the Legislatur

resulting in the creation of a toothless body rather than an effective vanguard fo

child rights in India. It appears that the Act has been passed by the parliame
more to pay lip service to the protection of child rights by creating anoth
Commission, rather than for achieving any specific results. The Commission
vested with illusory powers, and the Government has kept all important powers
as would affect the independence and working of the Commission with itself. In
fact, under section 33 of the Act, the Central Government reserves the power t

direct policy decisions of national importance to the Commission and further mak
the Central Government the final and overarching body in the case of a conflict. T
scheme of the Act is such as would enable the Central Government to overrule t

Commission at each and every step and control its working and even its ideology
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Instead, a possible approach could have

taking cognisance of the obligations of the G

and child rights in general. Further, the

complaints of violation of child rights comm
state actors, subject to an expansion in the d
PHRA.
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